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Policy Debate
FailURe oF tHe  
aiD SySteM iN Haiti
EDITOR’S NOTE
The ‘Policy Debate’ section of International Development Policy offers a platform where 
academics, policy makers and reflective practitioners engage in critical dialogue on specific 
development challenges. The initial lead paper is not peer-reviewed. Instead, it is followed by 
reactions and critical comments from different stakeholders.
The lead paper below, written by Jean-Marc Biquet (Médecin sans Frontières, MSF), is followed 
by reactions and analysis from Andrea Binder (Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin). 
Despite repeated requests to – and commitments from – the UN (UNOCHA in particular) to 
provide a response, we did unfortunately not get any written reaction to MSF’s article. Readers 
who are intetested are invited to contribute to this policy debate on our blog <http://devpol.
hypotheses.org/67>.
Haiti: between emergency and Reconstruction – 
an inadequate response
Initial contribution by Jean-Marc Biquet
Research Officer at Médecin sans Frontières (MSF – http://www.msf.org/). 
 biquet, J.-M. (2013) ‘Haiti: between emergency and Reconstruction – an inadequate response’, 
International Development Policy, no. 5.2, pp. 129–135, http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/poldev.1600.
‘This country has the best chance to escape its past than it’s ever had…  
As horrible as this is, it gives them a chance to start again.’ 
Bill Clinton, March 2010.1
The opinions expressed in this article reflect the opinions of the author and not necessarily those of MSF. The author would 
like to particularly thank Catrin Schulte-Hillen, Philippe Calain and Aurélie Lachant for their vital contributions.
1 Reuters (2010) ‘Haiti, donors face huge task to ‘build back better’ http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/28/
quake-haiti-donors-idUSN2822043320100328 (Accessed on May 16, 2013).
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on 12 January 2010, an earthquake struck Haiti. the cities and towns of 
Port-au-Prince, Gressier, Jacmel and léogâne were mostly destroyed. thou-
sands of inhabitants were killed and hundreds of thousands of others found 
themselves homeless.2
to make matters worse, the capital, where most of the infrastructure and 
the administration are concentrated, was severely affected. this was to have 
a definite impact on the capacity to deploy and organise the relief. the avai-
lability of healthcare, which was already underdeveloped3, was completely 
overwhelmed: 30 of the 49 hospitals in the damaged4 areas were destroyed 
or suffered significant damage. Medical personnel were also deeply affected 
by the earthquake.
Nearly all actors and observers recognise that the first phase of the earth-
quake response was adequate. once the initial days of chaos were over, the 
mobilisation of aid actors was impressive. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is 
not the only humanitarian organisation to have said that its post-earthquake 
investment in Haiti constitutes its biggest single action since its creation.5
1. Unkept promises and mixing roles
the former US president, appointed special envoy for Haiti by the United 
Nations Secretary-General, worked hard to mobilise donor countries in order 
to fund the response for this devastated country6: soon after the earthquake 
(New york conference in March 2010), some USD 5.33 billion were pledged 
by donor countries to rebuild Haiti for the period between 2010 and 2012 
alone.7 this substantial amount came on top of some USD 3 billion paid by 
private donors to the thousands of NGos that mobilised for the emergency 
and early recovery.8
With a sense of urgency, the international mobilisation quickly evolved from 
emergency relief to aid for early recovery and reconstruction. this paradigm 
shift corresponded to a shift in priorities: the urgency was no longer to meet 
the immediate needs of Haitians, but to work on improving conditions to 
address the needs of tomorrow, by rebuilding the country and strengthening 
the government through good governance, democracy, etc.9
the earthquake – a disaster – became an opportunity to (re)build the 
country – ‘a once-in-a-century chance for change’ (oxfam international, 2010). 
the mobilisation of pledges from donors was just as impressive as the mobi-
2 The figures themselves are subject to much controversy. According to the Haitian government at the time, the death 
toll amounted to 316,000. This figure is contested and reduced by some to a range between 46,000 and 85,000. See 
BBC (2011) ‘Report challenges Haiti earthquake death toll’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13606720 
(Accessed on May 16, 2013).
3 According to the PAHO, 40% of Haitians had no physical access to a healthcare service before the earthquake, while 
the financial barrier prevented the majority of the rest from using existing services.
4 Source: Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population – Haïti (MSPP) (Ministry of Public Health and Population).
5 MSF (2010) International Activity Report http://www.msf.org/international-activity-report-2010-haiti-year-crisis 
(Accessed on May 16, 2013)
6 This gave him the opportunity to recycle the ‘Build Back Better’ slogan, which he had already used as special envoy 
to Haiti after the 2008 cyclones. See Clinton B. in MIT Press (2010).
7 This figure excludes the reduction of the country’s debt. Data available in: United Nations Office of the Special Envoy 
for Haiti (2012). In September 2012, only 52.3% of this sum had actually been disbursed.
8 Approximate figure provided by the United Nations Office of the Special Envoy for Haiti.
9 See the recommendations of the NGOs in CAFOD, Christian Aid, Progressio and Tearfund (2011).
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lisation of aid actors: as many as 600 actors enlisted in the Health cluster, a 
mechanism to coordinate international actors operating in the health sector. 10
the optimism inherent in slogans was passed on as advice to actors in the 
field: according to Merlin, for example, it is necessary to ‘ensure that all huma-
nitarian responses contribute and build towards the longer term development 
of the health work force and health system’ (Merlin, 2011). the emergency 
response based on current needs is seen as having a negative impact on the 
objectives of future development.
three years on from the earthquake, what has become of the situation in 
Haiti? Some observers, such as Dara, an independent organisation that has 
evaluated donors’ response to the earthquake, consider that the famous ‘build 
back better’ is nothing more than a slogan (Dara, 2011).11
Uncertainty reigns supreme in terms of reconstruction projects, with res-
pect to both those of the Haitian government and those of major donors such 
as the World bank.12 Projects announced amidst much media attention have 
not begun, apparently for lack of means, such as the construction of a hospital 
in carrefour by the brazilian cooperation or that of a hospital in Gressier by 
the luxembourg Red cross, etc.
Meanwhile, the Haitian population has heard public announcements of 
international aid and witnessed its mass deployment, while results in terms 
of assistance have become less and less visible as time went by. For example, 
the emergency response aiming to guarantee shelter for the greatest number in 
the immediate aftermath of the earthquake rapidly provided the vast majority 
of the homeless with tarpaulins or tents, however, the situation has unfortu-
nately progressed little since then. in fact, the most ‘adequate’ solutions still 
depend on development programmes. Many Haitians are still living beneath 
these tents or tarpaulins almost three years after the earthquake, which is 
very problematic in a region so susceptible to hurricanes.13
this has created a lot of tension between international aid actors, the autho-
rities and the population. Perhaps too easily, distrust towards humanitarian 
organisations is palpable in both rhetoric and in the field. cynically, the 
inhabitants of Port-au-Prince speak of the ‘Republic of NGos’. identifiable 
by the colours of their flags and stickers, it is not uncommon for the cars of 
humanitarian organisations to be stoned.
the reactions of NGos have been uneasy and the rhetoric more cautious. but 
the frustration remains: ‘Firemen cannot be blamed for extinguishing a fire, 
but nor can they be asked to reconstruct the building.’14 yet there is clearly an 
imbalance between the means and the energy deployed on the one hand and, 
10 February 2010 figure.
11 Report cited and commented on by the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) (2012) Evaluation of Donor 
Response to Haiti Earthquake Shows ‘Building Back Better’ Nothing But a Slogan http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/
relief-and-reconstruction-watch/evaluation-of-donor-response-to-haiti-earthquake-shows-building-back-better-
nothing-but-a-slogan (Accessed on May 16, 2013).
12 Whose webpage for ‘Projects and Operations’ in Haiti gives ‘No records found’. Accessed 30/11/2012 - http://web.
worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=217672&piPK=64625826&theSitePK=2748750&menuPK=2805029&cat
egory=regcountries&regioncode=&countrycode=HT
13 370,000 people are still living in tents according to OCHA figures (September 2012).
14 Pierre Salignon, Director-General of Doctors of the World, interviewed in the magazine Là-Bas (January 2011) http://
www.labas-mag.fr/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/LB0016pages1.pdf (Accessed on May 16, 2013).
  132 | 
International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement
on the other, the limited results – or perceived results – of the collective effort 
made by aid actors. and the gap between what this discourse suggested and 
the reality is immense. Major donors and the Haitian government obviously 
bear a heavy responsibility, and the actors in the field have theirs. by promo-
ting the belief in a rapid recovery, they participated in fostering frustration.
the competition for media exposure – a supposed guarantee for access to 
funding –, the media pressure requiring the prevailing discourse to conti-
nue in the absence of new information to provide, or the need to provide 
token evidence to financial backers may potentially explain part of the lack of 
congruence between the promising messages conveyed, the visible deployment 
of actors and the actual results of this deployment. but other factors explain 
the rapid shift – at least in the rhetoric – towards immediate recovery.
the automatic and systemic nature of the transition in the order of priorities 
from the emergency to the reconstruction phase appeared to lack substance 
and be more part of a sequential theoretical model than the fruit of a rigorous 
analysis of the situation.
yet while immediate recovery is perhaps conceivable in the very short term 
in some aid sectors (education, agriculture, etc.), this cannot be the case in 
the health sector as long as the Haitians do not determine themselves what 
health system and policy they would like to establish and as massive means 
in terms of infrastructure and training have not been invested.
the shift to the slogan ‘trade not aid’, advocated by the recently elected 
president in Haiti and reprised by the major donors,15 could be based on the 
same principle of reality denial:16  in the mobilisation of efforts and resources, 
focusing on what may pave the foundation for decent and dignified living 
conditions for all in Haiti while, in the interim, hiding the fact that entire 
segments of Haitian society are without access to basic services (medical care, 
housing, water, etc.). yet this should be one of the main drivers behind the 
mobilisation of aid actors and their sponsors.
2. The aid apparatus has become an obstacle to the emergency response
the current system of relief provision was modelled some years ago in 
response to past shortcomings.17 the international community’s efforts to 
coordinate emergency relief led to the creation of a formal system, set up to 
rationalise ‘humanitarian aid’ as a whole. today, this system is based on a 
consolidated appeal Process (caP) for financial support, inter-organisational 
planning processes and ‘collective’ communication with the public, in the 
name of all.
our view, however, is that the actual capacity of the emergency relief 
deployed has not improved.
the flood of actors makes the need for coordination between them very 
important. according to the model, the creation of clusters (groups of actors 
15 Such as the Clinton Bush Haiti Fund or Canada.
16 For example, see the comments by William H. Frist published in the Washington Times (2012) Helping Haiti build back 
better – A hand up, not handouts http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jul/13/helping-haiti-build-back-better/ 
(Accessed on May 16, 2013).
17 To return to the origins of the introduction of the reform of the previous system initiated in 2005, see the 2005 ‘Huma-
nitarian Response Review’.
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combined by sector of activities and skills: shelter, health, food aid, etc.) 
should help to organise the aid and prepare the response to new emergencies.
thus, immediately after the earthquake, the Ministry of Public Health and 
Population (MSPP), the United Nations office for the coordination of Huma-
nitarian affairs (ocHa) and many NGos, in addition to other actors in the 
health domain, began to contribute to the effort in the field to ensure that Haiti 
would be ready in the event of a new emergency. in September 2010, emphasis 
was placed on the risk of hurricanes. the likelihood of a food crisis, another 
earthquake and an epidemic were also included in the envisaged scenarios.
Despite this preparation, the coordination system appeared to be profoundly 
lacking in the face of the cholera epidemic that took hold in october 2010. 
the epidemic was particularly virulent and came during a very tense elec-
toral period. the Haitian Health Ministry (MSPP) quickly assumed control 
of operations. one of its first decisions was to push aside the Health cluster, 
which had been established for this very purpose, and directly seek out ope-
rational actors to act immediately. Within three months, 209,034 cases and 
4,030 deaths were recorded.18 it was a new disaster, the number of victims 
rapidly surpassing the total number injured by the earthquake.19
the first reaction by the UN-steered aid coordination mechanisms was to 
launch a funding appeal to respond to the epidemic. yet this was at a time 
when, according to some reports, the funds collected in the aftermath of the 
earthquake were far from being spent.20
but in terms of the reaction to the cholera epidemic itself, the humanitarian 
coordination and its many actors did not appear to budge. Some 80% of patients 
received in the first three months were taken in by two actors which were not 
part of this Health cluster ‘coordination system’, namely the cuban medical 
brigades and MSF (the remainder were treated by twenty-odd organisations, 
including the Haitian Health Ministry).
this period of time was actually necessary for the mobilisation to materia-
lise in other actors effectively taking charge.21 Further still, this mobilisation 
did not last, as shown by a report from a US research centre published under 
the title Not Doing enough: Unnecessary Sickness and Death from cholera 
in Haiti in august 2011 (Johnston J. and K. bhatt, 2011).
the response in terms of water, hygiene and sanitation – so crucial in the 
face of this disease – was cruelly lacking, forcing MSF notably to take charge 
of these needs.
it is not the individual willingness of each organisation to react that we 
want to question,22 but rather the collective capacity to meet the expectations: 
emergency preparation – at the heart of ocHa missions – that was found 
18 Source of the Haitian Health Ministry (MSPP). These figures are approximate, as it is very likely that many cases have 
never been recorded.
19 More than 614,000 cases listed by the MSPP in November 2012.
20 The Huffington Post (2010) ‘Major Aid Organizations “Duped Donors” and “Failed Haiti” Group Charges’, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/georgianne-nienaber/major-aid-organizations-d_b_785847.html (Accessed on May 16, 2013).
21 The French Red Cross says it immediately opened its first cholera treatment centre on 25 January 2011. Save the 
Children announced the opening of its first centre on 4 January 2011.
22 Some have done their utmost, but often by confining their response to the areas where they were already deployed.
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lacking in the face of cholera. it was as if the quest for ‘a [perfect] solution’23 
did not bring ‘any real added value to the response.’ it was as if, in the end, 
it was limited to making an inventory of the virtual capacities in a roadmap 
comprising each actor, its deployment areas, its financial backing, its available 
stock and its staff under the heading ‘intervention resources’. the sum of these 
resources forms an effective response mechanism in theory, but inoperative 
in practice as soon as one actor in the chain is lacking. the system legitimises 
all actors that aim to take part, regardless of their real capacity or impact.
in the United Nations cluster system, relations between the various actors 
are standardised: consolidated appeal Processes (caP), subcontracting and 
framework agreements with which the actors must comply in the countries 
where they conduct their operations.
Funding and directives are passed down from top to bottom, while reports 
on ‘achievements’ and ‘lessons learned’ circulate from bottom to top. each 
change in action involves an accompanying change in agreements between 
actors and donors. this mechanism explains the paralyses and the system’s 
lack of flexibility. it favours neither rapid response in a constantly evolving 
environment nor the deployment of effective emergency relief.
each failure or delay on the part of an involved actor leads to dysfunction 
throughout the chain and can potentially lead to inaction. However, no one 
party is guilty, as the responsibility is shared, and no one party complains 
because all feel responsible.
in the case of Haiti, very little space was given to debating the very practical 
and technical questions necessary to meet real needs.24
in light of the shortcomings of the international community’s humanitarian 
response since the reform initiated in 2005, large traditional NGos, combining 
to form a consortium, launched a ‘transformative agenda’ process with the aim 
of providing improvements to aid organisation and coordination processes 
(iaSc, 2012). but based on the same aim to standardise, centralise and control 
the response, mixing reflection on needs and competition for access to funding, 
hopes of tangible improvements are, at this stage, thin.
it is therefore legitimate to ask how much leeway (independent assessment, 
evaluating constraints and action) such a system allows and whether this 
system exists for itself or to respond to real needs.
two years after the onset of the cholera epidemic, and despite the Haitian 
Prime Minister having declared it under control,25 several thousands of cases 
23 In reference to the United Nations inter-agency website aiming to exchange information in order to improve humani-
tarian coordination in emergencies: http://www.oneresponse.info.
24 A subgroup (mini cluster) involving the largest NGOs active in the health domain was created. It met separately with a 
view to working more efficiently. But even in these conditions it was difficult to deal with medical questions and problems 
relating to the health system. Differences in involvement (primary healthcare, hospital care) and philosophies between 
the various organisations (integrated in the MSPP, private healthcare) as well as different policies and modus operandi 
account for this phenomenon. All in all, close to seven subgroups were created in the health domain. Actual participation 
represents the equivalent of a full-time job for the coordinators of some organisations.
25 Statement by the Prime Minister on 26/9/2012 cited by newspaper Française Nouvelles, ‘Haïti PM, dit épidémie de 
choléra sous contrôle’ http://www.francaisenouvelles.com/haiti-pm-dit-epidemie-de-cholera-sous-controle/ (Accessed 
on May 16, 2013).
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were still recorded in 2012. in November 2012, MSF’s cholera treatment struc-
tures were still receiving 250 new cases per week.26
an ambitious plan to eradicate cholera within 10 years has recently been 
announced.27 this MSPP plan, with the backing of cDc atlanta, PaHo and 
UNiceF, will require the mobilisation of USD 2.2 billion, the first millions of 
which are yet to be found. yet another empty promise, at a time when caring 
for the sick is yet to be integrated into the range of services offered by the 
medical structures of the MSPP.28
Haiti has experienced a one-off situation, suffering two large-scale disas-
ters in quick succession. this context obviously has its own characteristics, 
such as the weakness of the state as a provider of basic public services to its 
citizens or the historic deficit in terms of reputation of the United Nations 
as such. the fact remains that it would be irresponsible to hide behind the 
later exception and shy away from questioning the coordination system and 
the real capacity for aid that it offers, in addition to its propensity to promise 
more than it can deliver…
ReFeReNceS
26 MSF (2012) ‘Haiti: Cholera remains major public health problem’ http://www.msf.org/article/haiti-cholera-remains-
major-public-health-problem (Accessed on May 16, 2013).
27 Trenton, D. ‘Haiti, DR Hope to Eliminate Cholera with $2.2 Billion Plan with International Groups.’ The Washington 
Post, 28 Nov. 2012. Web. 30 Nov. 2012
28 In the city of Port-au-Prince, MSF provides care for 62% of the sick.
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is the Humanitarian Failure in Haiti a System Failure? 
a comment on Jean-Marc biquet’s critique ‘Haiti:  
between emergency and Reconstruction – an inadequate Response’
Reaction by Andrea Binder
Associate director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin
<http://www.gppi.net/>.
 binder, a. (2013) ‘is the Humanitarian Failure in Haiti a System Failure?’, International 
Development Policy, no. 5.2, pp. 136–144, http://dx.doi.org/10.4000/poldev.1625.
it has become common sense in humanitarian circles to refer to the emer-
gency responses to the 2010 Haiti earthquake and subsequent cholera outbreak 
as a failure. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) began doing so publicly in a 
December 2010 article published in The Guardian.29 in this regard, Jean-
Marc biquet’s article – ‘Haiti: between emergency and Reconstruction. an 
inadequate Response’ – reflects a long list of publications that describe and 
analyse the international system’s shortcomings in responding to Haiti’s twin 
2010 disasters.30
there are, however, two arguments in biquet’s piece worth examining in 
more detail. First, he claims that the earthquake and cholera responses were 
inadequate because the resources mobilized, and the international promises 
to quickly ‘build back better’, did not match the results expected by the Hai-
tian people. in doing so, biquet implies that expectation management is an 
important part of a successful humanitarian response. this point is rarely 
made in the humanitarian discourse regarding the success or failure of indi-
vidual operations. this comment will thus consider biquet’s argument about 
expectation management in more detail.
Second, biquet argues that with respect to effective emergency response, 
the mainstream international humanitarian system itself is the problem, 
rather than the solution. MSF has made this assertion about system failure, 
or the risk thereof, from the inception of the humanitarian reform agenda 
and the introduction of the cluster system in 2005.31 it is one of the reasons 
MSF does not officially participate in cluster coordination. For many in MSF, 
29 Unni Karunakara (2010) Haiti: Where aid failed. http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/dec/28/haiti-cho-
lera-earthquake-aid-agencies-failure (accessed 22/07/2013).
30 See, for example Katz, Jonathan M. (2013) The Big Truck That Went By: How the World Came to Save Haiti and Left 
Behind a Disaster. (New York: Palgrave McMillan); Ramachandran, Vijaya/Julie Walz. 2012. ‘Haiti: Where Has All the 
Money Gone?’ (London: Center for Global Development), http://international.cgdev.org/blog/haiti-where-has-all-money-
gone, accessed 26/07/2013; Ramachandran, Vijaya. 2013. ‘Haiti’s Earthquake Generated a $9bn Response – Where Did 
the Money Go?,’ http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/jan/14/haiti-earthquake-where-
did-money-go (accessed 26/06/2013).
31 See Médecins Sans Frontières. International Activity Report 2006. ‘United Nations: Deceptive Humanitarian Reforms?’, 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/report.cfm?id=3230, accessed 26/07/2013; Derderian, Katha-
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the Haiti case serves to prove their point. this argument – unlike the first 
regarding expectation management – has been made over and over again. this 
review thus asks: Does Haiti really prove the system is faulty? What alterna-
tive approaches to the cluster system are MSF and other critics promoting? 
Successful Humanitarian Operations are a Function of the Capacity to 
Deliver and the Integrity to Manage Expectations of Aid Recipients
let’s begin with the first argument. a successful collective humanitarian 
operation is an equation with two variables: the capacity of humanitarian 
actors to deliver and the integrity to manage the expectations of the affected 
population.32
the massive scope of the emergency relief the international community 
levied in response to the earthquake in Haiti is well known. yet, despite this 
enormous mobilization of financial and human resources, the results did 
not match expectations. biquet argues this asymmetry between outcome and 
expectations is due to the fact that many international actors promised the 
unachievable: to ‘build back better’, as stated by bill clinton, and to affect a 
quick recovery in a chronically poor country with a long, troubled history of 
successive natural disasters, social unrest, bad governance and unfair trade 
regulations.33 in his piece, biquet finds these promises to be disingenuous, 
or ‘reality denial’ (p. 3), given the scale of death and destruction caused by 
the earthquake. Slogans such as ‘build back better’ and ‘trade, not aid’, while 
primarily targeted towards public and private donors in rich countries, raised 
expectations of a better future among Haitians. but the situation of many 
Haitians affected by the earthquake has not significantly improved since the 
early stages of the international response. Who is to blame? 
before biquet moves on to the standard answer to this question – the Haitian 
government, major international donors and, to some degree, humanitarian 
organizations – he makes an interesting point:  ‘[t]here is clearly an imbalance 
between the means and the energy deployed on the one hand and, on the other, 
the limited results – or perceived results – of the collective effort made by aid 
actors. and the gap between what this discourse suggested [with respect to 
building back better and quick recovery] and the reality is immense’ (p. 3). 
in other words, the failure of the earthquake response is a matter of its per-
ceived results. that is, as biquet points out, success and failure do not depend 
solely on objective measures. they also depend on perceptions. the extrava-
gant promises made to impress donors and motivate the Haitian government 
belittled the actual results achieved. the fact that 279,000 Haitians remain 
homeless is as much the result of structural urban poverty in Haiti as it is 
reflective of the limits of the international emergency response.34 as one Hai-
tian government employee pointed out during the iaSc real time evaluation:35
32 Biquet makes this argument implicitly, but I believe the way I present it here reflects one of the author’s key points, 
made in the section ‘Unkept Promises and Mixing Roles’.
33 For example Paul Farmer. 2006. The Uses of Haiti. Common Courage Press; and Paul Farmer. 2011. Haiti After the 
Earthquake. (New York: PublicAffairs).
34 http://emergingfrontiersblog.com/2013/07/19/haiti-sees-big-drop-in-quake-homeless/, last accessed 26/07/2013.
35 Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binder. 2012. ‘Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months After the Earthquake.’ 
(Plaisians: Berlin), http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/media/pub/2010/binder_2010_haiti-RTE.pdf, (accessed 22/07/2013).
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‘The problem of the international humanitarian community is that they 
have to mount an emergency shelter response without being able to distinguish 
between those who are homeless anyway and those who are homeless due to 
the earthquake. My guess would be that at least 30 per cent of the people under 
tents and tarpaulins in Port-au-Prince belong to the former group.’36 
this example is paradigmatic of the overall situation in Haiti, applying 
equally – as Jean-Marc biquet demonstrates – to other basic services such 
as access to clean water or healthcare. Managing expectations, rather than 
creating false hope, is therefore an important responsibility of the humanita-
rian community. Given the Haitian context, biquet’s tacit argument that the 
optimistic slogans were disingenuous promises is thus a harsh, though not 
misplaced, criticism.
it sheds light upon a problem rarely discussed in humanitarian circles. the 
messages and slogans invented in New york, london or Geneva to impress 
public and private donors affect people on the ground. their effect on the 
Haitian people became obvious during the beneficiary consultations and 
focus group discussions conducted with Haitian humanitarian organizations 
during the iaSc real time evaluation. Haitians complained about the way 
they were portrayed in Western (media) reports, while also expressing hope 
in the promise that this would be a turning point for Haiti, and thus their 
personal history.37
communication was an important issue throughout the earthquake res-
ponse, not least because the international humanitarian community had 
difficulties managing the international media during the early stages of the 
disaster (Grünewald, binder 2010)38. Furthermore, the communication with 
Disaster affected communities (cDac) piloted its first field presence in Haiti, 
using radio shows, travelling events (‘Koute ayiti’ – listen to Haiti) and SMS to 
establish two-way communication between the aid community and Haitians. 
cDac Haiti also provided support for the coordination of the international 
humanitarian community’s communication strategy.39 Nevertheless, the dis-
cussions regarding the role of communication in the earthquake response 
did not recognize that in a virtually connected world, the messages created 
for domestic audiences in the West are also available to the affected people. 
consequently, managing the expectations of affected governments and popu-
lations through sensible, realistic messaging should become part of huma-
nitarian organizations’ operational duties. if any humanitarian response is 
36 Conversation of the author with an employee of the Ministry of Youth and Education, Port-au-Prince, April 2010.
37 This was one of the motivations for the production of the evaluation movie directed by Francois Grünewald to 
complement the IASC real-time evaluation of the earthquake response. The movie is available online at http://vimeo.
com/15198053 (accessed 22/07/2013).
38 Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binde (2012) ‘Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months After the Ear-
thquake.’ (Plaisians: Berlin) http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/media/pub/2010/binder_2010_haiti-RTE.pdf (accessed 
22/07/2013).
39 CDAC provides coordinated communication services in crisis situations so that humanitarian actors can inform the 
affected population and enable the population to report back to them. http://www.cdacnetwork.org/public/content/
cdac-haiti-and-koute-ayiti-caravan (accessed 26/07/2013); Cecilia M. Ljungman (2012) CDAC Haiti Learning Review. http://
www.cdacnetwork.org/sites/www.cdacnetwork.org/files/cdac0612_haiti_lr_005_full_0.pdf (accessed 26/07/2013).
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to be perceived as successful, learning this lesson from Haiti is key. During 
the cholera response, which the Western media covered only marginally, the 
attention paid to communication, including the engagement of cDac Haiti, 
paled in comparison to that of the earthquake response.40
Do the Haiti Responses Indicate Systemic Failure? 
like many others, biquet insists that the mistakes made in response to 
earthquake in Haiti are symptomatic of system failure. there certainly is 
much to be criticized regarding the cluster system and humanitarian reform 
and their implementation in Haiti.41 Upon my departure from Haiti in april 
2010, having conducted the iaSc real-time evaluation for the international 
response, i shared this gloom about the international humanitarian system. 
With some distance, however, and from a scientific perspective, i believe this 
generalized critique must be rejected for three reasons.
First, a single case is not enough to condemn an entire system. based on an 
analysis of six case studies (including Haiti), the iaSc cluster approach eva-
luation ii concluded that the benefits of the cluster system ‘slightly outweigh 
its cost and shortcomings.’42  in light of the difficult history of humanitarian 
coordination,43 this ‘slightly’ should prevent us from leaping to the conclusion 
of system failure with respect to Haiti. Reform, particularly reform across large 
and diverse organizations such as the UN, large international NGos and the 
icRc, takes a lot of time. and by ‘a lot of time’, we are referring to decades, not 
years.44 if actors have a genuine interest in improving humanitarian assistance, 
they should thus refrain from calling for the reform of the reform too quickly. 
Nevertheless, this is exactly what happened. Following the experience of two 
40 Yo Pale, Ann Kite (2011) ‘Let Them Speak: Best Practice and Lessons Learned in Communication with Disaster 
Affected Communities.’ InfoAsAid, http://infoasaid.org/research/ann-kite-yo-pale-best-practice-and-lessons-learned-
communication-disaster-affected-communit (accessed 26/07/2013); Wall, Imogen (2011) ‘Delivering Communications in 
an Emergency Response: Observations from Haiti.’ Humanitarian Exchange Magazine (52) 2011. http://www.odihpn.org/
humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-52/delivering-communications-in-an-emergency-response-observations-from-
haiti (accessed 26/07/2013).
41 See Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binder (2012) ‘Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months After the 
Earthquake.’ (Plaisians: Berlin) http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/media/pub/2010/binder_2010_haiti-RTE.pdf (accessed 
22/07/2013);  IASC. 2010. ‘Response to the Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti: Following the 12 January 2010 Earthquake.’ 
http://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/response-humanitarian-crisis-haiti-following-12-january-2010-earthquake-achieve-
ments (accessed 26/06/2013); Bhattacharjee, Abhijit/Roberta Lossio (2011) ‘Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti 
Earthquake.’ https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Evaluation%20of%20OCHA%20Response%20to%20the%20
Haiti%20Earthquake.pdf (accessed 26/07/2013) overview at http://www.alnap.org/current/haitiportalresources.aspx
42 Andrea Binder and Francois Grünewald (2009) Cluster Evaluation Phase II Country Study Haiti. http://www.gppi.net/
fileadmin/gppi/GPPi-URD_Cluster_II_Evaluation_HAITI_e.pdf (accessed 26/07/2013); Julia Steets, Francois Grünewald, 
Andrea Binder et.al. (2010) Cluster Evaluation Phase II Synthesis Report, p. 11. http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/GPPi-
URD_Cluster_II_Evaluation_SYNTHESIS_REPORT_e.pdf, (accessed 26/07/2013).
43 Maurer, Tim (2013) ‘Governing International Humanitarian Assistance: The Politics of a Business that is about Saving 
Lives’ ; Barnett, Michael and Thomas G. Weiss (2008) ‘Humanitarianism: A Brief History of the Present.’ In: Michael Bar-
nett/Thomas G. Weiss (eds.). Humanitarianism in Question – Politics, Power, and Ethics. ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press); 
Donini, Antonio (1996) The Policies of Mercy: UN coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Rwanda. Occasional Paper 
series #22 (Providence: Brown University; Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies).
44 On institutional change, see, for example North, Douglass C (1993) ‘Towards a Theory of Institutional Change. ‘In: 
Political Economy: Institutions, Competition and Representation: Proceedings of the Seventh International Symposium in Eco-
nomic Theory and Econometrics. William A. Barnett, Melvin J. Hinich, Normal J. Schofield (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press) 61-69; Pierson, Paul (2000) ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics.’ The Ameri-
can Political Science Review 94(2): 251-67.
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exceptionally large disasters in 2010 – Haiti and the Pakistan floods – inter-
national humanitarian reform was profoundly questioned. at the same time, 
many smaller, less controversial crises were overlooked as potential evidence 
for the evaluation as to how well (or poorly) ‘the system’ actually performed. 
the cases of Haiti and Pakistan were sufficient such that key actors, including 
the emergency Response coordinator Valerie amos, felt it necessary to invent 
a new rallying cry: the transformative agenda.45 the humanitarian reform 
process is now politically endangered before its complete establishment and 
implementation.
Second, if we want to evaluate whether Haiti has been a system failure, 
we need to disaggregate ‘Haiti’ into two separate large-scale disasters – the 
earthquake and the cholera epidemic. although the geographic location is 
the same, the two Haitian disasters were distinct. the earthquake was a sud-
den-onset urban disaster. the vast majority of casualties occurred within the 
first few hours after the earthquake struck. it caused the visible destruction 
of life and infrastructure. this conspicuous destruction made the required 
response fairly obvious to humanitarian specialists and generalists alike. the 
earthquake was widely mediatized and funded. it concerned all humanitarian 
sectors, from child protection to food assistance.
the cholera outbreak, in contrast, began as a silent disaster with a mere 
three cases in rural artibonite.46 it was essentially neglected by the media and 
suffered from donor fatigue (although, as biquet points out, many organiza-
tions continued to have more than enough money on hand due to the financial 
largess they experienced in the aftermath of the earthquake). the outbreak 
mainly affected the health, water and sanitation sectors of humanitarian res-
ponse, requiring health specialists to devise an accurate and effective strategy.
Moreover, in between these two Haitian emergencies, a third sweeping 
humanitarian crisis erupted with floods in Pakistan. the flood response drew 
many humanitarian workers from the caribbean to central asia. as a result, 
the international humanitarian staff that conducted the earthquake response, 
including cluster coordinators and heads of agencies, had been nearly com-
pletely transferred out of the country when the cholera epidemic broke out.
‘one country. one year. two different disasters. two different performances 
of the cluster system, at least from the point of view of the health sector. During 
the earthquake response the cluster system was actually helpful. During the 
cholera response, it failed us.’47  this is the bottom-line for a former senior 
MSF staffer, one of the few people involved in the response to both Haitian 
emergencies. For him, the varying performance of ‘the system’ derives from 
differences in individual leadership – an analysis supported by third-party 
evaluations of humanitarian coordination during the two disasters.48 Whereas 
an emergency-oriented individual led the health cluster during the earthquake 
45 Interview with OCHA, Geneva, July 2013.
46 Telephone Interview with former MSF staff, July 2013.
47 Telephone Interview with former MSF staff, July 2013.
48 Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binder (2010) ‘Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 months After the Ear-
thquake.’ (Plaisians: Berlin) http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/media/pub/2010/binder_2010_haiti-RTE.pdf, (accessed 
22/07/2013); Patrick, Jonathan (2011) ‘Evaluation Insights. Haiti Earthquake Response: Emerging Lessons Learned’, 
http://www.oecd.org/countries/haiti/50313700.pdf, (accessed 26/07/2013); Bhattacharjee, Abhijit and Roberta Lossio.
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response, the WHo/PaHo Head of office at the time of the cholera outbreak 
was development-oriented. lacking experience in cholera response (as the 
disease is not endemic in latin america), the cluster lead decided to back 
the demands of the Haitian Ministry of Public Health and Population for 
the capacity-building required to allow the Haitian government to address 
cholera itself. after all, at the time, the outbreak was limited to only three 
cases. although correct in principle – particularly considering the gross 
undermining of the Haitian government’s capability and authority during 
the earthquake response – this decision proved deadly.49 Within weeks, the 
disease spun out of control, catching a large portion of the humanitarian 
community unprepared.50 only the two organisations that stayed outside 
the cluster strategy – MSF and the cuban Medical brigades – were prepared 
for the wave of cholera infections that befell Haiti in autumn 2010. as biquet 
points out, they collectively treated 80 per cent of all cases in 2010/11. ‘Never-
theless, if you want to, you can find something good about the cluster, even 
in this case. Without it, WHo/PaHo might never have come up to MSF and 
tell us about these three cases in artibonite. this information was crucial 
for our timely response.’51 
a third reason the Haiti responses do not demonstrate systemic failure is 
logical fallacy in attributing the behaviour of cluster members to the approach 
itself. biquet argues that there were too many actors without sufficient expe-
rience or expertise present in Haiti. this claim is backed by evidence.52 He 
blames this problem upon the cluster system’s purported tendency ‘to legi-
timise all actors that aim to take part, regardless of their real capacity or 
impact’ (p. 5). international humanitarian response, however, faced a nearly 
identical situation in Sri lanka after the tsunami, before the cluster system 
was even born. the cluster approach, moreover, was never intended to func-
tion as a selection mechanism, but rather to coordinate actors on the ground. 
interestingly, the system was flexible enough to develop an informal selection 
mechanism during the Haiti earthquake response. the WHo, together with 
five relevant health organizations (including MSF), formed a ‘baby-cluster’ 
to discuss strategic questions, while general cluster meetings were used to 
share information and so on.53 Nevertheless, this approach does not make the 
necessary step of tackling the lack of a selection mechanism at the systemic 
level. attempts to do so through certification schemes and legal regulations 
(2011) ‘Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake’ https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Evaluation%20
of%20OCHA%20Response%20to%20the%20Haiti%20Earthquake.pdf, (accessed 26/07/2013).
49 See, for example, Bhattacharjee, Abhijit and Roberta Lossio. (2011) ‘Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earth-
quake’ https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/Evaluation%20of%20OCHA%20Response%20to%20the%20Haiti%20
Earthquake.pdf, (accessed 26/07/2013).; Doucet, Isabeau (2011) ‘The Nation: NGOs Have Failed Haiti,’ http://www.npr.
org/2011/01/13/132884795/the-nation-how-ngos-have-failed-haiti, (accessed 26/07/2013); IASC (2011) ‘Inter-Agency 
Real-Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Earthquake in Haiti: 20 months after,’ http://www.unicef.org/
evaluation/files/IA_RTE_Haiti_phase_2_final_report(1).pdf, (accessed 26/07/2013).
50 http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5945a1.htm?s_cid=mm5945a1_w
51 Telephone interview with former MSF staff, July 2013.
52 For example, Paul Farmer (2012); Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binder (2010).
53 Francois Grünewald and Andrea Binder (2012) ‘Inter-agency Real-time Evaluation in Haiti: 3 Months After the Ear-
thquake.’ (Plaisians: Berlin) http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/media/pub/2010/binder_2010_haiti-RTE.pdf (accessed 
22/07/2013).
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have gained momentum in recent years, but they remain at the margins of 
humanitarian discourse.54
Transparency regulations for commodity traders
While not solely sufficient as a tool for realizing change, transparency does 
address one problem at the core of the rentier political economy: informational 
asymmetries. the political elite who control countries like angola, the DRc 
and turkmenistan hold onto important information in order to expand the 
ease and discretion with which they operate. these imbalances in information 
occur between the state and its citizens, as well as within government itself. 
in Nigeria, for example, the government’s finance agencies and the national 
oil company regularly disagree on how much money one party owes to the 
other, with the former unable to access adequately detailed information about 
oil revenue generation. as a result, the public, accountability actors like jour-
nalists, and parliamentarians and even government officials cannot engage 
in an informed debate about natural resource governance.
Switzerland itself illustrates this point. as noted by the berne Declara-
tion (a NGo coalition), the Federal administration’s own March 2013 report 
failed to disclose how much commodity trading companies pay in taxes to 
Switzerland, stating, ‘there are, at present no figures available on tax reve-
nues deriving from the commodities industry’ (berne Declaration, 2013). if 
the public is meant to weigh the benefits and costs of hosting these massive 
companies, and to consider what policy response is appropriate, the amount 
of tax revenues is a crucial fact to consider.
Dr. thut, in his paper, calls for ‘the design and further refinement of the 
regulatory framework in Switzerland, in so far as relevant to the nexus 
between commodity issues and the legitimate interests and needs of deve-
loping countries.’ the U.S. and the e.U., themselves home to many large oil 
and mining companies, have responded to this same challenge by introdu-
cing regulations that require extractive companies to publish the payments 
they make to foreign governments on a per project basis. Following this lead, 
and ensuring that the laws apply to commodity traders, represents a basic 
first step to ensure coherence between regulation at home and development 
programs abroad.
commodity trading is in particular need of this kind of regulation. the 
deals between traders and governments, both the purchase of raw materials 
and the sale of refined products, often have massive financial implications 
for developing countries. to give a sense of the scale, for example, Glencore 
was just awarded the license to buy oil from the government of chad. in 
January 2013, the company shipped its first cargo of 950,000 barrels.55 this 
single sale would net at least USD 80 million. this may represent a small- or 
medium-sized deal for Glencore, but for a poor country like chad, this is a 
massive transaction: the revenues from this single sale are enough to pay for 
half of the country’s yearly education budget. in countries including Nigeria, 
54 http://www.schr.info/certification-project/ (accessed 26/07/2013); http://ifrc.org/PageFiles/41194/113600-idrl-
deskstudy-en.pdf, p. 90ff.
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congo-brazzaville, azerbaijan, yemen, iraq, libya, South Sudan and angola, 
the sale of oil by the state generates more than half of government revenues. 
For many others states, these sales generate the single largest revenue stream.
on the import side, oil trader trafigura currently supplies all of angola’s 
fuel needs, which is a multi-billion dollar business. and these sales can be 
corruption-prone: Nigeria spent USD 22 billion on fuel subsidies from 2009-
2011, with significant fuel being bought from Swiss traders such as Mercuria 
and trafigura, and around USD 7 billion was lost due to a scam of historic 
proportions.56
Without the disclosure of basic information around commodity sales, cor-
ruption risks increase, and there is little chance for citizens, journalists and 
parliaments to know how much their country receives for its public resources. 
Requiring companies to operate in a transparent and responsible manner 
does not constitute unfair or uncompetitive treatment. trading companies 
are huge global players that buy billions of dollars of oil and minerals from 
poor countries. Wherever they are headquartered in the world, they should 
be the subject of robust oversight and scrutiny. ensuring this is the case is a 
basic responsibility of the home government, and one which the Switzerland 
should not avoid.
opacity in payments by traders is not the only practice requiring the atten-
tion of the Swiss authorities. other practices that generate concern include 
the influence of huge traders on global market and price integrity, the trade 
in stolen oil, such as from Nigeria, or sanctioned oil, such as from iran, and 
taxation and transfer pricing abuses by trading companies. but given the 
precedent set by the US and eU governments, and the prevalence of high-
value deals between trading companies and producer countries with bad 
governance, robust and mandatory reporting standards are a good place to 
start tackling some of the challenges associated with such trade.
An Inadequate Style of Criticism
in this reaction to Jean-Marc biquet’s critique of the international response 
in Haiti, i gave the cluster system greater benefit of the doubt than i have in 
the past. this is not to ‘shy away’ (p. 6) from making mistakes transparent 
and calling for accountability. our iaSc real-time evaluation was outspoken 
about leadership failures, sidelining local initiatives and other shortcomings. 
However, the style of criticism levied by MSF against the cluster approach 
makes it necessary to call for a more nuanced analysis.
the raison d’être of MSF, of course, is to speak out. increasingly, its ‘témoi-
gnage’ seems to highlight not only the situation of affected people but also the 
failures of the humanitarian system. it includes an admirable transparency 
about the organization’s own difficulties.57 this transparency, in combination 
57 see MSF (2011), Humanitarian Negotiations Revealed: The MSF Experience http://www.msf-crash.org/livres/en/huma-
nitarian-negotiations-revealed (accessed 02/11/2013).
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with the organization’s high-quality work in Haiti, makes it particularly well 
placed to offer criticism.58
biquet perceives this criticism as a duty, arguing, ‘it would be irresponsible 
to hide behind […] Haiti’s exceptional situation […] of suffering two large-
scale disasters in quick succession […] and shy away from questioning the 
coordination system and the real capacity for aid that it offers […].’ but huma-
nitarian practitioners and academics have not refrained from self-criticism 
in the case of Haiti. What is lacking is not criticism, but productive ideas 
as to how to make the system work, improve coordination and leadership, 
respect local initiatives, and limit the number of actors in large-scale, easily 
accessible disasters.
it is time for MSF to grow out of the role of the nagger and start shaping 
the discourse about the future of collective humanitarianism constructively.
58 MSF (2011) OCG response to cholera in Haiti http://evaluation.msf.at/fileadmin/evaluation/files/documents/reports/
Eval_Report_Cholera_Haiti_external_Dec_2011.pdf (accessed 02/11/2013).
